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Abstract The process of elaboration of the symbolic universe leads to exciting insights 
regarding the search for human emotional security.  The symbols end up as explanatory 
axes of universal reality and on them were constructed myths that form a superstructure 
for belief systems.  Human society is a multilevel system with a material structure 
(society), an ideological superstructure (belief systems, values, etc) and a 
supersuperstructure with two parts: mythical (origin and justification) and utopic (final 
goal). All mythical belief systems have a numinous-religious nature.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT ARE MYTHS? 
 
In its true meaning, the myth is a sacred narrative and therefore symbolic. The story-
telling of myth is not just story-telling it functioned as sacred history. It is Symbolic, 
and it links referent with significance, especially sacred significance. The potent social 
function of myth facilitates its use in interpreting literature, speech and revealed 
religion. Thus, for example, the myth of Oedipus is interpreted as literary tragedy from 
the pen of Sophocles. No doubt Sophocles' tragedy has its origin in myth as a symbolic 
oral narration of family psychodynamics to explain family relationships. Myths are 
symbolic tales of the distant past (often from primordial times) that concern cosmogony 
and cosmology (the origin and nature of the universe), that may be connected to belief 
systems or rituals, and may serve to direct social action and values. Myths that can be 
described as “cosmogonic,” or “origin” myths, function to provide order or cosmology, 
based on “cosmic” from the Greek kosmos meaning order (Leeming 1990; Bascom, 
1965). Cosmology’s concern with the order of the universe finds narrative, symbolic 
expression in myths, which often helps establish important values or aspects of a 
culture’s worldview.  For many people, myths remain a value-laden discourse that 
explains much about human nature.  
Let us note that every myth usually involves rituals that are somewhat bodily and/or 
"Monumental" (spatial and temporal) inscriptions or, most often, a combination of both. 
It is therefore quite possible that the combinational logic of myth expresses in narrative 
important features a society’s experience. Put another way, it seems possible to decode 
the combinatorial logic behind myth-making. This logic constrains the “interpretation” 
of the relationships (harmonic / disharmonic) between the members of a group of people 
and their environment.  
Myths also: 
 
Myths can provide continuity and stability to a culture. The stories themselves promote 
values, history and literature. Through them we connect with each other, to our 
ancestors, to the natural world around us and with other cultures. 
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When myths speak of the activities and attitudes of deities, the moral tone implies 
society's expectations of our own behaviors and norms. In myths, we see archetypal 
situations and some of the options that can be selected. 
Myths also justify the activities of a culture. Through the respect shown to authority and 
the characters in them, myths establish social customs, cultural rituals, religious 
principles, laws, social structures, power hierarchies, territorial claims, arts and crafts, 
festivals, and technical expertise for hunting and war. 
The myths give meaning to life. We transcend our common life in a world in which 
deities interact with humans, and we believe that our daily actions are part of divine 
schemes. In our daily life our problems are more bearable because we can interpret the 
difficulties as having meaning. It is possible to place human suffering in a larger 
context, rather than feeling battered by random causes. And when we read that a 
particular deity experienced something we're supporting - maybe a fight against the 
"forces of evil" - we can feel that our own struggle could have a cosmic significance 
being similar to archetypal struggles, though on a smaller scale. 
Myths reveal our fate after death, and the reasons for crises or miracles, yet retain and 
even encourage an aura of mystery. Myths also satisfy our need to understand the 
natural world. This purpose of mythology was especially important before the advent of 
modern science, in which the Big Bang theory replaces creation myths, and the theory 
of evolution replaces myths concerning the origin of the humanity. Finally, myths offer 
role models that children learn about in comics and cartoons and often imitate (Gash & 
Domínguez Rodríguez, 2009). 
  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to say exactly what the myths meant to those for whom 
they were central to their culture. Certainly, in so far as mythical thinking is an aspect of 
the human spirit showing a "wild" untamed face with its non-critical assembly of facts. 
In man there is always mythical or wild thought, although we may distrust it or try to 
exclude it. However, as Schweder (1977) had pointed out the human mind is inclined to 
seek connections between events where there is no good evidence for a causal 
connection. What we get from myth thus depends on our own world vision and our 
readiness to accept mythic connections. The evidence on risk assessment strongly 
supports this view of cognition (Evans, 2012). 
 
The story-telling culture is clearly not always about a mythic narrative. Rather 
describing and explaining myths involves examining the recursive systems involved in 
people’s understanding of their culture, in fact, the "myth story" could be illustrated 
with the symbol of the interlocking circles: 
 
1) Circle of Orality: The word can be considered as power. In this case naming 
functions both to capture and give life. The word in this way can become a 
(re)creative game that allows substantial cultural insights. In Hebrew adama 
means land, from this comes the word to define man: Adam. In the Hebrew 
culture a man without land is not a human being. If one considers the suffix dam 
(blood), it has the same root as Adom (red), Dam, Adama, Adam, Adom. If these 
concepts are what define existence, then there is no choice but to shed blood for 
the sake of the land that defined Adam as a human being. Again, Rome (ROMA) 
if we write it backwards (AMOR) is a symbol of Love (AMOR). And a final 
example, myth, from the Greek mythos, means word-narrative, and as such, can 
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be contrasted with logos, word-speech, remembering that the written word loses 
the life it has in oral expression.  
2) Circle of Origin: The mythical story explains Time before the time we know, or 
the Event before the events. So, this story, in its essential aspect and therefore 
"sacred" aspect, tends to meet the Time before time, the Model before copies, 
and to repeat what worked (as well) in the Origin. The present then imitates and 
repeats the Great Past. Similarly, the future will be the Grand Past finally 
recovered, reinterpreted. It will be well appointed and well told. We have said 
"origin", but it would be better to speak of "the origins" because "at the origin" 
not everything is concomitant. The origin of the gods usually precedes that of 
men, and is preceded in turn by the world. Similarly, the origin of women tends 
to follow that of man. In other words, in every culture there is a myth about 
origin because it recounts a primary event that we cannot locate in ordinary time.  
3) Operating Circle: Finally, the mythic narrative is operational, it is necessary 
that the storyteller and hearers act as though this is the case. One is reminded of 
the serious nature of genuine Irish music played in a pub. It is considered very 
bad manners to talk during such a performance. Myth telling is not just any 
storyteller or any public, nor does this “narrative” occur in any place or time. On 
the contrary, the myth requires a ritual to create a dual unit between teller and 
audience. Community and myths are intertwined to the point where whoever is 
excluded from hearing the myth is also excluded from the community. 
Conversely, whoever is not a member of the community, to them myth does not 
say anything. In other words, when story uses the word as power and sacred 
play, and recounts the occurrence of what came to its fullness for the first time 
in Primordial Time, and the story joins with the ritual to imitate its efficient 
operation, all in a symbolic language, then that narration is a mythic narrative. 
Regarding what seems enigmatic and unbelievable, myth tells about the 
incredible in the immanent present. Just as with the "miracle" of the creation of 
the world, all other particular miracles seems small. In a similar way all 
unbelievable particular myths are not "as" unbelievable as the creation myth. It 
is as if the incredible fact of existence could only be a correspondingly amazing 
story. The more fabulous the story, the more likely it is to be adjusted to reality. 
Moreover, the word, being invisible is the only mechanism capable of capturing 
the invisible in the future. Myth does not explain in the proper sense, but it 
narrates, imitates and represents through rituals It tells a symbolic story about 
the bond between members of a community that, thanks to the myth-ritual, 
believe in its integrity and this includes narrating its sacred origin. For modern 
man, believing and understanding maintain a strained feedback relationship: one 
must understand to believe, but one believes in understanding. In a way in myth, 
belief and understanding are the same. Such fusion is possible thanks to the 
plasticity, openness, and manageability of symbols that always says something 
more than word-images. 
 
From classical times positions on myths have been well defined: 
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1) Myths are pure fable. In the best case, myths are a free, bland and venial game. 
At worst, they are dangerous and harmful because of their possible 
consequences. This is the position of Xenophanes of Colophon1. 
2) Myths have some truth. Myths talk about some meaningful feature of the human 
condition. In other words, by using allegorical procedures, they take a different 
perspective on something that could be described directly. They say “otherwise” 
what one could say "real". Sometimes the meanings are hidden but with careful 
examination one can find the meaning. Myths mask a reality-truth. Who lifts the 
veil can name the truth and reveal the reality since this then dispenses with the 
myth and one sees it only as an allegorical ornament, a literary procedure, or a 
means to imagine what it has to abstract the conceptual "reality-truth". That was 
Euhemerus’ position2. 
3) Myths speak of a different truth from that understood in conceptual discourse. 
Myths speak of a way to grasp the absolute other. Myths often tell of the 
"origin" or "final" or "permanent cause". They speak to that "absolutely other" 
that poetry, art or philosophy try to say in their own way. Myths tell of the 
ineffable, the indescribable, like something that has appeared for the "first time", 
and is still there, that “quite another” there is in all things. 
 
Confronting these three attitudes, we realize in fact that the first two have something in 
common. Indeed, to put myth on the side of fable, it definitely disqualifies any pretense 
of truth, however small the claim may be. But on the other hand to recognize myth as 
containing some truth, it remains important not reject the myth, useless after being 
thorough analysis. When we talk about something, we always have reasons to ask the 
question: What are we talking about? But once we recognize what we mean "really", 
                                                          
1 Xenophanes was a phusikoi in the Milesian tradition He was born in Colophon, not far from Miletus, 
around the year 570 B.C. After Colophon fell to Medes, Xenophanes left the city, becoming a wandering 
poet and philosopher. It is not known exactly where he traveled, but it seems likely that he visited 
southern Italy at some point, since he is clearly familiar with the Pythagorean doctrine of the 
transmigration of souls. He apparently wrote on purely poetic matters, even authoring a work on how to 
prepare for a drinking party (symposium), but he was also very interested in natural philosophy and 
religion. He was adamant in rejecting the Olympian account of the gods, insisting instead that there is 
only one, non-anthropomorphic god who is unmoving, but all-seeing, all-hearing, and all thinking, and 
who controls the universe with his thought. It seems plausible that his theological views were in a sense 
similar to the theological views of the Milesian philosophers, who all seemed to attribute some sort of 
divinity to their physis.  
 
2 Euhemerus, 300 B.C., Cyrenaic philosopher, b. Sicily. He is famous for a theory of mythology 
embodied in his philosophical romance, Sacred History, a work of which only fragments remain. 
Euhemerus' theory, called after him euhemerism, was that the gods originated from the elaboration of 
traditions of distinguished historical persons. His theory was consistent with the attempts of his period to 
explain religious beliefs in terms of naturalism. "As regards the gods, then, men of ancient times have 
handed down to later generations two different conceptions: Certain of the gods, they say, are eternal 
and imperishable, such as the sun and the moon and the other stars of the heavens, and the winds as well 
and whatever else possesses a nature similar to theirs; for each of these the genesis and duration are 
from everlasting to everlasting. But the other gods, we are told, were terrestrial beings who attained to 
immortal honor and fame because of their benefactions to mankind, such as Herakles, Dionysus, 
Aristaeus, and the others who were like them...” 
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then myth is as futile as an insufficient explanation compared to a better explanation, as 
useless as a partial truth compared to a proved truth. 
Only the third approach clearly expressed the value and dynamics of the myth, whether 
we believe in an "all other" transcendent, invisible forever true, as a truth revealed. In 
myth it becomes visible and we are able to speak. By demythologizing we do not find 
the truth, not even if we discover, in the best case, the knowledge, but we tend to 
"guess" the truth of the "absolutely other", or the truth that goes along with the thing. 
We will briefly examine Plato’s treatment of myths. On the one hand he uses myth, 
narrated in his own way. Sometimes he even uses myths as educational or socially 
useful "lies". That gives an idea of his ambivalence, however when he resorts to myth 
because it is the only way to think about topics that seem impossible or too difficult for 
a number of onlookers.And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual 
tales which may be devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for 
the most 
part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when they are grown 
up? (Republic, http://www.idph.net, page 230-231.  To raise an obvious question, Plato 
criticizes mother and nurses, most of whose fables to be rejected. After criticizing 
Hesiod, Homer and other poets who composed fables that told lies (Platón, 1989).  
 
Cohen’s (1869) description of myths also brings up the idea of falsehood: 
Cosmogonic Narratives, connected with the foundation or origin of the universe. These 
narratives have a sacred nature often connected with some ritual. They have an 
educational role and reflect the social order or the values within a culture. They are 
representative of a particular epistemology or a way of understanding nature and 
organizing thought. Mythic narratives often involve Heroic characters (possibly proto-
humans, super humans, or gods) and may be counter-factual in featuring actors and 
actions. 
 
For Tylor (1871), myth provides knowledge of the physical world as an end in itself. 
Myth and science are identical in one function. Both serve to account for all events in 
the physical world. Yet they are not redundant accounts, the two are incompatible. It is 
not simply that myth is no longer needed once science arises, myth is no longer 
possible. Mythic explanations of human phenomena like customs and institutions may 
be fantastic and in that sense unscientific. Frazer (1922) argues that the knowledge that 
myth provides is a means of understanding the physical world. Myth is false because it 
is tied to magic, which stems from the failure to make basic logical distinctions. As 
illustrated by voodoo, magic fails to distinguish between symbol and the symbolized. 
Magic puts myth into practice in the form of ritual, which is an attempt to gain control 
over the physical world, especially over crops. Typically, the king plays the role of the 
key god of the pantheon, that of vegetation, and acts out the key part of the myth, or 
biography, of the god: his death and rebirth. 
Anthropologist and folklorist Paul Radin (1950) considers myth distinctive because of 
its function and implications that are determined by certain individual society members. 
The myth-makers then explain symbolically how to live, as Radin (1950: 370) notes: “A 
myth is always explanatory. The explanatory theme often is so completely dominant that 
everything else becomes subordinated to it . . .” Myths serve to explain and encourage a 
worldview and good actions within society. Many other theorists of myth concur that it 
has this functional dimension.  
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Myths differ from other narratives commonly collected as folk tales and legends. Many 
of the great social theorists of the 19th century and early 20th century, used myths as 
evidence of universal truths. Lévi-Strauss (1974) used deductive methods  to analyze 
myths. Recently, William Hansen (1998), argued that the sacred element of myth is a 
recent addition to the definition of myth. But in his studies of ancient Greek myths, 
Hansen (1998) points out that not all myths have a sacred element. They were not 
necessarily related to religious beliefs, but were often secular stories. While some myths 
do not have to have a sacred element, myths in general do seem to share an educational 
role in providing a worldview. Myths have been defined as true stories of ancient times. 
Malinowski (1992) added that they must be sacred, and discussed how they served 
society as a charter for action. Malinowski argued that myth is essential for the 
perpetuation and maintenance of normal social processes. Bidney (1950) following 
Malinowski, contends that every society clearly distinguishes between myth, fact (or 
what is taken for fact) and fiction (folk-tale).  In this sense, then, no society is different 
from any other. Insofar as myth is the issue, the difference between one society and 
another is in the kind of myth developed. Pre-critical societies develop myths 
concerning magic and their culture-heroes; critical but pre-scientific societies develop 
myths concerning the miraculous and supernatural; scientific societies develop myths 
about experience, which is presumably what Bidney means by “secular myths”.  
Bultmann (1953) acknowledges that, read literally, myth is about the physical world, is 
incompatible with science, and should be rejected as uncompromisingly as Tylor (ibid.) 
and Frazer (ibid.) rejected it. Bultmann proposes reading myth symbolically. Taken 
symbolically, or ‘demythologized’, myth is no longer about the external world. It is now 
about the place of human beings in the world. Myth no longer explains but describes, 
and describes not the world itself but humans’ experience of it. It describes the 
alienation from the world that humans experience before turning to God and the at-
homeness in the world that they experience upon turning to God. It depicts the human 
condition. 
Jonas (1963) seeks to show that ancient myths retain a message for moderns rather than 
to show that moderns have myths of their own. For Jonas, myth, read symbolically, 
describes the alienation of humans from the world prior to their acceptance of God. 
Because ancient Gnosticism, unlike mainstream Christianity, sets immateriality against 
matter, humans remain alienated from the material world even after they have found the 
true God. In fact, the true God can be found only by rejecting the false god of the 
material world. Gnostics overcome alienation from this world only by transcending the 
world. Eliade (1968), myth explains the origin of both physical and social phenomena, 
just as for Malinowski. And the explanation is that a god – though never a mere human 
– brought it about. For Eliade, in contrast to Malinowski, myth is a part of religion. But 
the payoff of myth is not reconciliation to the unpleasantries of life. Quite the opposite: 
the payoff is escape from the world and return to the time of the origin of whatever 
phenomenon is explained. Myth is like a magic carpet. Because all religions, according 
to Eliade, preach that gods were closer at hand in days of yore than now, to be whisked 
back in time is to be able to brush up against the god at work in the myth. Myth is a 
medium for encountering God. 
As Blumenberg (1985) has shown in some detail, mythos’s essential mode of 
functioning is ‘‘theatrical.’’ Mythos presents the world as high drama, constructing 
stories that help make the listener feel at ease in the world: ‘‘Myth represents a world of 
stories that localizes the hearer’s standpoint in time in such a way that the fund of the 
monstrous and the unbearable recedes in relation to him’’. This theatrical mode of 
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orientation endows the world with what Blumenberg calls ‘‘significance,’’ a 
transcendental, pre-cognitive framing or ‘‘charging’’ of the experiential horizon with a 
‘‘valenced’’ sense of purposiveness or meaningfulness that is prior to the determination 
of any specific purpose or meaning (Rose, 2007). 
For Phillip Cary (2011): “what the soul is, what makes the human soul different from 
the beasts and what happens to it after death was a matter or myth, speculation, and 
disagreement”. For Segal (2011), myth can be true as well as false, but explaining the 
tenacity with which myth is held counts even more. Myth does not hold a tighter grip 
when true than when false. 
Myths, as explanations of the cosmos and how to live, are parallel to science in many 
ways. Yet because of their differences from science, they often appear insignificant, 
whimsical, useless, or primitive to contemporary people. Many people lament the 
decline of myths, because they promise the moral guidance and comfort that helps 
enrich life. For these reasons, many people remain interested in myths and seek to 
revive or revere them. Additionally, myths continue to intrigue us because of their rich 
symbolic, metaphorical, and narrative appeal. Some people believe classical music, 
movies, and even novels have filled the places myths used to occupy culturally. In our 
post-modern world many people believe myths exist in new, combined, or revived 
forms. One of the functions of all art is to reconcile us to paradox. Another is to suggest 
fundamental patterns of life and the universe. Even if they are no longer associated with 
religious rituals, belief systems, or primordial moments of creation, "myths" of heroic 
characters who mediate the troubling paradoxes of life will always compel us and can, 
we believe, still be found in our culture.  
Myths may be enacted through rituals and believed in absolutely, but they usually do 
not have physical effects in the real world, as in leading to new technology for building 
cars or providing medical treatment. People may believe they are cured through faith, 
and they may find important value-laden sentiments in myths, but these "real world 
results" are neither empirical nor usually repeatable. Although science differs from 
myth in offering actual, testable control over the environment and producing real, 
repeatable results in the world, science is not completely divorced from myth. Many 
scientific theories are presented or understood in narrative form, which often end up 
sounding remarkably mythic.  
As myth gives meaning and purpose to even the most seemingly disparate and 
fragmented elements of culture, so it affirms life processes of change and 
refashioning. Myth provides the ideal values of the culture. Many of western moral 
values, for example, come from the Jewish-Christian myths. The story of David and 
Goliath is one reason why we revere courage. Murder and theft are regarded as wrong 
and evil, as the myth of Moses teaches us. The myth of Noah and the Ark tells us of the 
consequences of evil and righteousness. To summarize then, myth provides a guide for 
the individual throughout his life; one that aids him to live in health, strength, and 
harmony in the particular society in which he was born. For Sylvie Brunel (2008) a 
critic of the basis of the sustainable development, with its binary vision of the world, 
can be compared to the Christian mythical vision of Good and Evil, an idealized nature 
where the human being is an animal like the others or even an alien. Nature – as 
Rousseau thought – is better than the human being. The human is a parasite, harmful for 
the nature. But the human is the one who protects the biodiversity, where normally only 
the strong survive 
 
2. THE WEINREB’S MYTHICAL DIMENSION 
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Mythical systems are concerned with hidden meanings. In classical psychology such 
meanings were central in the psychology of Freud and Jung especially in their emphasis 
on the unconscious. Following in this tradition Weinreb (1986) described a mythical 
dimension that contains symbolic images.  In fact, Weinreb maintains that everything in 
the concrete world is experienced as a mental picture in the mythical dimension. There 
is nothing in the experienced sensory world that is not related to another imaginary 
dimension (Figure 1). Such ideas are also part of Celtic culture in which aspects of 
nature resonate with the cultural imagination. 
 
The mythical dimension has a number of characteristics: 
 
1) Space and time have a different meaning from one we are used to : 
a) In terms of space, myths do not contain materials like our ordinary 
experience; so the images do not work with the same logic, and relations 
and influences may be magical.  
In terms of time, past, present and future may not be separate; so, past present and future 
may merge, mythic events are not constrained by ordinary time as we know it. In myth, 
death can be a transformation, where the future, the past and the present exist at one and 
the same time.  
Another important characteristic of the mythical dimension is that not only do things 
appear differently, but their mythical quality is immediately present. This has 
implications for their cultural meanings. The entire natural-material world in which we 
exist may be symbolically meaningful in myth, since all its creatures exist in another 
dimension. 
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Figure 1: The Weinreb’s mythical dimension. 
 
These creatures have meaningful and mutual relationships which are usually hidden 
from our awareness. Becoming aware of this spiritual meaning requires preparation and 
a particular awareness and readiness. Such preparation and the resulting awareness 
provide rich cultural meanings that can transform our personal experience.  
2) We might consider the mythical dimension as the Whole, and concrete reality as 
Part. However, this part is only partly in human consciousness, since people 
who focus in their communication on the mythical dimension will begin to see 
the material world in its larger context. Although people’s experience is 
naturally very varied, the unifying nature of the mythical dimension may unify a 
person’s vision of the world, whether this be in a truly mythic way or in way 
characteristic of another spiritual vision. There may be stages in this process 
leading from polytheistic myths to monotheistic myths: polytheistic myths being 
prior to a unifying vision of reality, with a single Divine Being.  
3) The mythical dimension is closely connected with people’s imagination and 
spiritual life. Where Jung draws out these ideas with his unconscious, Weinreb's 
emphasises the mythical dimension. Indeed, the unconscious includes both 
personal and cultural content of which we may but are not necessarily aware.  
4) As Freud realized we can become aware of unconscious meanings through 
analysis of our dreams. Our dreams are the products of our minds at moments 
when we are not exercising any cognitive control. Whether the content is 
culturally or personally determined is an open question, but we can be sure that 
Mythical superstucture 
(MS)
Subject (S)
Structural base(SB)
Physical dimensions
Mythical 
dimension
 physical 
 time t
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in some way the system of memories of which we are unaware emerge and so 
we have access to mental issues that are otherwise hidden.. 
5) Weinreb (1986) claims that the myths derive, in principle, from one source of 
inspiration and therefore can be approached using the same commentary 
methods: he applied this principle to the Bible, the Oral Tradition as well as to 
the New Testament. Weinreb's commentary on the New Testament has 
typological, mythical and archetypal features in accordance with the 
aforementioned principles: it gives the New Testament a universal dimension 
which transcends Christianity.  
 
The religious behavior is as practical as the technical behavior; it assures a man 
integration to a world that exceeds him and with that he understands both physics and 
the metaphysical.  To each stage of this integration there corresponds a phase of 
religious behavior. While the old phases of the beliefs have extended until the present, 
in each historical stage a new phase was added that dominated the others. 
 
In what follows, distinctions are made between what the individual knows, and what the 
culture or society knows. The mathematical model that is proposed must take account of 
both classical logic and what is called paralogic. This corresponds to the curious facility 
of the human mind to take shortcuts and make associations that are not logical 
(Schweder, 1996). Such illogical human moves are called heuristics.  The social 
knowledge considered here consists of superstructures of myths and beliefs (doxical 
superstructure). Mathematical models must take account of an individual’s incomplete 
knowledge of objects and events and their possibility and contingency, knowledge is 
after all psychological and not logical. These terms will be clarified in the sections that 
follow on the modelling of both mythical thinking and the beliefs that myth contains. 
 
3. MODAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MYTHS 
 
A belief system is a set of related ideas, learned and shared which has some permanence 
in time and space, and to which individuals and/or groups exhibit some commitment 
(Usó-Doménech et al., 2009 a,b; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b; Usó-
Doménech and Nescolarde Selva, 2012). The conditions of permanence, commitment, 
and connectedness are variable characteristics through which we expect belief systems 
to be related to social organization.  Any belief system will be formed by two essential 
levels:  
 
1) An ideal or abstract level.  
 
2) A material level or text.  
 
Substantive beliefs (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013c,d Usó-Doménech and 
Nescolarde Selva, 2012) constitute the axioms of the system, while many derived 
beliefs will constitute their theorems.  
 
Let{ } 1,...,i i nM = be a set of mythical dimensions and L be a language. The terms S in this 
language are of the following form 1 2, ,....., ns s s . The terms D are the following form
1 2, ,....., md d d .  
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In a set S of substantive beliefs, we have the following characteristics:   
 
1) The terms sn (for n= 0, 1, 2,…,n) are atomic sentences. 
 
2) The terms dm (for m= 0, 1, 2,…,ns) are atomic sentences. 
 
3) The terms s and d belonging to sets S and D are belief sentences.  
 
4) S is consistent just if it would be possible for them all to be true together: that is, 
if they are either in fact all true or could all have been true. 
 
5) S is inconsistent just if it would be impossible for them all to be true. 
 
6) A term s S∈ can also be said to be consistent if it is possible for it to be true.  
 
7) A term s S∈ can also be said to be inconsistent if it is not possible for it to be 
true.  
 
8) An inconsistent belief is said to be self-contradictory, or a contradiction3.  
 
9) A term s S∈ , which could not be false, is said to express a necessary truth.  
 
10) A term s S∈ , which is not inconsistent and does not express a necessary truth is 
said to be contingent. 
 
For our intentions, we will apply concepts of Modal Logic. 
 Let ┬ be the constant for truth, ┴ be the constant for falsity. →, □, ◊ be the signs for 
conditionality, necessity and possibility respectively. Then: 
 
1) A term s of the form □s is true iff s is true at all { } 1,...,k i i nM M =∈  . 
                                                          
3 A paraconsistent treatment of problems such as a philosophy of religion that accommodates certain 
antinomian assertions. In doing so, it offers as an underlying logic to build theory, that is not a classical 
logic like an Aristotelian logic, but rather a logic that we call a paraconsistent logic. 
In religious texts is often very difficult to paraphrase well. It is often forged in a way where the same God 
and the same context, in relation to the same entities and under the same aspect, has contradictory 
characteristics such as benign and malevolent, sweet and angry, fearful and kind, inaccessible and 
accessible, indulgent and severe -not to mention many other contradictions that perhaps could be 
susceptible to other reinterpretations, less literal and more charitable, and all this in an absolute way 
without nuances.  The more or less obvious meaning of many of these texts and discourses imply that 
God has each pair of opposite determinations in a special way, owning each to a high degree. The 
doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum, the interpenetration, interdependence and unification of opposites 
has long been one of the defining characteristics of mystical (as opposed to philosophical) thought. 
Whereas mystics have often held that their experience can only be described in terms that violate PNC 
(the principal of non-contradiction) western philosophers have generally maintained that this fundamental 
logical principle is inviolable. 
An Ionian contradiction to the compound proposition PP ¬∧ , that is the logical conjunction "P and not 
P". For Heraclitus such contradiction can be expressed a truth. An Ionian proposition designate as K(ℵ), 
is an Ionian contradiction P ∧ ¬P whose truth value is always 1, i.e. v(P ∧ ¬P) =1. 
 
po
st-
pri
nt 
Co
rre
sp
on
din
g a
uth
r: j
os
ue
.se
lva
@
ua
.es
 
12 
 
2) A term s of the form ◊s is true iff { } 1,...,k i i nM M =∃ ∈  where s is true. 
 
The set{ } 1,...,i i nM =  collects just those mythical dimensions for which the corresponding 
term sn is true. Term sn is true for a mythical dimension MK iff MK is in { } 1,...,i i nM = . 
 
Definition 1: A belief system בש is a pair { } 1,..., ,i i nM M=  in which{ } 1,...,i i nM =   is a set of 
mythical dimensions and Μ abbreviates a finite sequence 1 2, ,.... nM M M  of subsets of 
{ } 1,...,i i nM = . 
 
Let s be a term and Mk be a mythical dimension in a belief system בש = 
{ } 1,..., ,i i nM M= . We use the symbolism ╞ בש MK (s) as short for s is true in בש. The 
following axioms are stated: 
 
Axiom 1:  ╞ בש MK (sn) iff kM∃ ∈Μ for k = 0, 1, 2,…,n. 
 
Axiom 2: ╞ בש MK ┬. 
 
Axiom 3: Not ╞ בש MK ┴. 
 
Axiom 4: ╞ בש MK (┐sn) iff not ╞ בש MK (sn). 
 
Axiom 5: ╞ בש MK ( )i js s∧  iff both╞ בש MK (si) and ╞ בש MK (sj). 
 
Axiom 6: ╞ בש MK ( )i js s∨  iff either ╞ בש MK (si) or ╞ בש MK (sj), or both. 
 
Axiom 7: ╞ בש MK (□sn)iff for every ML in Μ, ╞ בש ML (sn). 
 
Axiom 8: ╞ בש MK (◊sn)iff for some ML in Μ, ╞ בש ML (sn). 
 
Axiom 9: ╞ בש MK s iff ╞ בש MK s then ╞ בש MK s’. 
 
We write ╞ s to mean that belief s is valid. A belief s is valid ╞ s iff for every belief 
system בש and every mythical dimension MK in בש,  ╞ בש MK s.  
From this we deduce the following theorems 
 
Theorem 1: □s s→ .  
 
Proof: 
 
It is sufficient to prove that where MK is any mythical dimension in any belief system 
בש, ╞ בש MK□s s→ . It is enough to show that if ╞ בש MK□s then ╞ בש MK s. So suppose that 
╞ בש MK□s. Then by axiom 8 this means that ╞ בש ML s for every mythical dimension in 
בש. In particular this hold for MK. Then ╞ בש MK s. 
 
's→
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Theorem 2 (Principle of Distributivity): □ ( )s s′→ →  (□s→□s’). 
 
Proof: 
 
We suppose that MK is a mythical dimension such that both ╞ בש MK□(s → s’) and ╞ בש 
MK□s. For every mythical dimension ML, both ╞ בש ML s→ s’ and ╞ בש ML s, from which it 
follows that for every mythical dimension ML, ╞ בש ML s’. Thus ╞ בש MK□s’. 
 
Theorem 3 (Rule of Necessitation): If ╞ s then ╞ □s. 
 
Proof: 
 
For suppose that ╞ s, i.e., that ╞ בש MK s for every mythical dimension. Then ╞ בש MK□s, 
which is to say that ╞ □s. 
 
Let SB be a believing subject. According to Pietroski (1993) the binary analysis is 
applied by means of the following requirements:   
 
R1) SB believes that the term s is true exactly when SB believes the sentence 
signified by s. 
 
R2) Property of omnidoxasticity4: If SB believes the terms 1 2, ,....., ns s s , and 
{ }1,....., ns s  entails , then SB also believes d. 
 
R3) That s signifies a set of mythical dimensions { } 1,...,k i i nM M =∈ where s is true . 
 
R4) There is some true sentence ζ, which is similar to s.   
 
R5) The truth of any s requires SB to have an appropriate metalinguistic belief.  
 
R6) In the mythical dimensions{ } 1,...,i i nM = , the requirement R5 is dropped by 
omitting requirement R4.   
 
R7) In abnormal contexts, such as where determined ideological beliefs are 
attributed, the requirement R5 is dropped omitting requirement R3.   
 
If SB believes that s is true, it follows that SB believes {MK: s is true in MK}. 
 
Example 1: Let L be the SB’s language. We suppose other language L’. We consider 
that SB is told that God does not exist is a true L’ term, but he has no idea what it means. 
SB still believes that God does exist, but taking his other term in L’ to be trustworthy, he 
comes to acquire the new belief that God does not exist is true. So he now believes that 
set P={MK: God does not exist is true in MK}. Consider the term “SB believes that God 
does not exist”, which intuitively is false. If we suppose that this in a mythical 
                                                          
4 Omnidoxicity refers to the unrealistic treatment of believers as “ideal” (Kieron O'Hara et.al. 1995). 
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dimension where R4 does not apply, then the that-clause denotes the necessarily true 
term, of which set P is a subset. Since SB believes P, for the Property of omnidoxasticity 
(R2), he also believes the necessarily true term, and so the term s true. On the other 
hand, if we adopt the other mythical reading which drops R3, then the that-clause in 
both cases would denote the same metalinguistic proposition R = {MK: something 
similar to God does not exist is true in MK}, and so P M⊂ . As SB believes P by R2 
again he believes R. The conclusion is that for all-admissible interpretations, “SB 
believes that God does not exist” is true. Then we have a contradiction.  
 
Myth, like any other belief, can be false, but it is not false because it is myth. It is false 
for the same reasons that other beliefs are false (Gotesky, 1952). Every culture will 
create and value its own myths, not because it may not be able to distinguish between 
truth and falsity, but because their function is to maintain and preserve a culture against 
disruption and destruction. They serve to keep men going against defeat, frustration, 
disappointment; and they preserve institutions and institutional process. The myths 
which will be acceptable in a given culture will obviously depend, not merely upon its 
scientific criteria, but upon the interests and needs of the individuals and groups which 
compose the society. Depending, of course, on the complexity of the society, theories of 
levels of truth or kinds of truths will be invented to defend beliefs which may be found 
inconsistent with what may loosely be called “the facts of experience.” Of course, these 
beliefs (myths) may later be rejected because ways may be found to test them which 
may prove them false, or because they are not socially useful. However, in a uniformly 
scientific culture, myths which contradict experience and reason will obviously be 
unacceptable. 
 
4. THE MYTHICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE (MS) 
 
Deontical Impure Systems (DIS)5 are concerned with possibility and necessity, their 
Superstructure can been divided in two (Usó-Domènech et al. 2009a,b; Nescolarde-Selva 
and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b,c; Usó-Domènech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012):  
1) The Doxical Superstructure (DS) is formed by values in fact, political and 
religious ideologies and culture of a human society in a certain historical time.   
2) The Mythical Superstructure (MS) also has been divided into two parts:  
                                                          
5 Impure sets (Maddy, 1990) are sets whose referential elements (absolute beings) are not counted as 
abstract objects and have the following conditions: a) They are real (material or energetic absolute 
beings). b) They exist independently of the Subject. c) S develops p-significances on them. d) True things 
can be said about them. e) Subject can know these true things about them. f) They have properties that 
support a robust notion of mathematical truth. A simple impure system-linkage Σ ≡ (M, R) is a semiotic 
system consisting of the pair formed by an impure object set M the elements of which are p-significances 
(relative beings) of entities belonging to Reality (absolute beings) or certain attributes of these, and a set 
of binary relations, such that R ⊂ P(M x M) =  P(M2). That is∀r ∈ R/r ⊂ MXM being 
( ){ }, ,i j i jr x x M M x x M= ∈ × ∈ . An impure system-linkage defined within an impure object set 
M is a simple system S = (M, R) or a finite union of simple systems-linkage Σ = ∪ni=1 Σ i such that Σ i are 
simple systems.  This shall be denoted as Σ ≡ (M, R) such that R ⊂ P(∪finiteM2). A Deontical system is an 
organization of knowledge on the part of the subject S that fulfils the following conditions:  a) Other 
subjects (human beings) are elements of the system. b) Some existing relations between elements have 
Deontic modalities.  c) There is purpose (purposes).   
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a) MS1 containing the mythical components or primogenial bases of the 
ideologies and cultures with ideal values. 
b)  MS2 containing ideal values and utopias that are the wished and 
unattainable goals of belief systems of the Doxical Superstructure (DS).   
 
These ideas are summarized in the following diagram (Figure 2): 
 
There is a double distortion in the ideological phenomenon concerning the opposition 
between the significance of the real object (relative being) and the reality of this same 
object (absolute being). Then, the relation between the structural base SB and 
Superstructures (DS and MS) can be considered for each one of the facts that have been 
isolated like components in one or another symbolic system. There are a series of 
correspondences and each one grasps a social reality.  
 
Doxical Superstructure 
 (DS) 
Values in fact, Dom inant Ideology, 
Culture: Science, Art, Folk beliefs, 
Primogenial Base (PB) 
 Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(materialization)Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  Ideal Values, Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
image (denotative-DS-image). 
denotative-MS-projection
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
Structural Base
Figure 2: Structural base and superstructures. 
 
We will call the set of doxical superstructural significants ζD (Usó-Domènech. and 
Nescolarde-Selva, 2012): that is to say, the part of the signs that have been limited by 
the observer Subject, when establishing the borders of the determinate Ideological 
Doxical Superstructure (IDS) that “cover” the determinate social structures. Let LM be 
the set of possible mythical superstructure individuals, that is to say, the totality of 
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abstract mythical objects/persons and relations belonging to the Mythical Superstructure 
(MS). Let { }DS DSI i=  be the set of possible deontical superstructure individuals, that is 
to say, the totality of abstract objects/persons and relations including within the doxical 
superstructure IDS of system Σ  
There is a mythical superstructural significance (MS-significance) signified as Ms∑  that is 
a function of the maps’ set Dζ  as a subset of LM.  MS-significances are the meaning in 
the mind of the Subject of the elements belonging to the Mythical Superstructure. MS-
significance Ms∑ has in Dζ  an attribution in respect to the abstract relation
k
iR belonging 
to DS if ( )k Mi DR s ζ∑∈ . Normally, any actor Subject confuses IDS-significances and 
MS-significances. 
Corresponding to some certain MS-significance Ms∑ in MS, there is a single IDS-
significance Ms
→
∑ to which we will call denotative-IDS-projection (IDS-projection) of the 
MS-significance Ms∑ in the doxical superstructure (DS) and that 
Ms
→
∑ for each Dζ and for 
each ( ), MDS DS DS Di I i s ζ
→
∑∈ ∈ , iff ( )C MDS Di s ζ∑∈ . The totality of IDS-projections on 
Doxical Superstructure (DS) form a subsystem of the systems of beliefs (among them 
the dominant ideology) that conform to the Doxical Superstructure.  The IDS-projection 
of the MS on the Doxical Superstructure (DS) is for the Subjects the primitive and 
subconscious explanation of the ideal and abstract doxical superstructure. Any dominant 
ideology has as a “foundation“ a myth or residual ideology, which projects on the 
Doxical Superstructure.  For each IDS-significance Ds there is a single MS-significance 
Mε  that we will call the mythical superstructural image (MS-image) of s M∑  in MS and 
that ( ) { },k kM D i D iR s Rε ζ = ∈ . 
The part of the Mythical Superstructure containing myths constitutes the Primogenial 
Base (PB) of the Doxical Superstructure (DS).   
The mythical superstructural image formed in the MS constitutes for the actor Subject 
(considered here as a believer) the last goal of his belief, that is to say, the Utopia.  The 
totality of the MS-images reflected in the utopic part of the Mythical Superstructure 
(MS) forms an Ideal Structure (Utopic Structure ISt) that constitutes the final and 
unattainable goal of all ideology.   
IDS-significance and its MS-image are equivalent, that is to say, that for Dζ and for 
each abstract relation kiR , 
k
iR  has Ds in Dζ  , iff 
k
iR has Mε in Dζ . This assertion leads us 
to kD is R∈  iff ( )ki M DR ε ζ∈ . 
Any Subject S has or constructs a certain language LM containing denotative-IDS-
predicates (IDS-predicates) and mythical structural predicates (MS-predicates). A 
denotative-IDS-predicate (IDS-predicate) DSP  is that predicate belonging to LM that 
express (names) one IDS-significance Ds  . Any mythical structural predicate (MS-
predicate) MP is that predicate belonging to LM that expresses (names) one MS-
significance Mε  
Let us suppose that observer subject S names (in LM) like υ* any abstract relation kiR , 
then: 
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1)  DSP υ∗ is true in Dζ  if the abstract relation 
k
iR  that υ* express in LM, has Ds  in 
.  
2) MP υ∗ is true in Dζ  if the abstract relation 
k
iR  that υ* express in LM, has Dε  in 
Dζ .  
 
The relation between one IDS-significance and its MS-image induces equivalence 
between the predicates of language LM in the following way:   
 
Property 1: If DSP express  and if MP express Mε in LM, then if υ* names one 
abstract relation kiR , 
DSP υ∗ is true iff MP υ∗ is true. 
 
We propose :  For each Dζ and for each abstract relation 
k
iR  if 
k
iR  there is in Dζ  then 
( )ki M DR ε ζ∈ iff ( )k Mi DR s ζ
→
∑∈  Logically, the idea is that 
Ms
→
∑  is the only IDS-
significance that agrees with MS-significance Ms∑  in relation to all the possible existing 
abstract relations.  Then we may say that:   
 
Property 2: In the language LM if MP expresses (it names) Ms∑  and if 
DSP  expresses (it 
names) Ms
→
∑ , then if υ
∗ expresses (it names) an existing abstract relation, then DSP ρ∗ is 
true iff DSP υ∗ . 
 
 
Figure 3 represents the hypothesis of the relationship between the structural base- 
doxical and the mythical superstructures in a second approach. The Ideal will be formed 
by the Mythical Superstructure ( )PB ISt∪ and the present experience formed by the 
Ideological Doxical Superstructure (IDS) and the Structural Base (SB).   
 
ζD is the set of doxical superstructural signifiers, that is to say, the parts of signs that 
have been limited by the observer Subject when establishing the borders of the 
determinate Ideological Doxical Superstructure “covering” a determinate Structural 
Base (SB). Let LPB be the set of possible primogenial bases (belonging to the Mythical 
Superstructure) individuals, that is to say, the totality of abstract mythical objects and 
relations belonging to the Primogenial Base Mythical Superstructure (PB). Let LISt be 
the set of possible ideal structures (belonging to Mythical Superstructure) individuals, 
that is to say, the totality of abstract mythical objects and relations belonging to the 
Ideal Structure Mythical Superstructure (ISt). Let { }DS DSI i= be the set of possible 
deontical superstructure individuals, that is to say, the totality of abstract 
objects/persons and relations included within the Ideological Doxical Superstructure 
IDS. 
 
The primogenial base mythical superstructural significance (PBMS-significance) is 
denoted as PBMs∑ and is a function that maps the set Dζ  to a subset of LPB.  PBMS-
Dξ
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significances are the meaning in the mind of the Subject of the elements belonging to 
the Primogenial Base Mythical Superstructure. The ideal structure mythical 
superstructural significance (IStMS-significance) is denoted as IStMs∑ and is a function 
that maps set Dζ  to a subset of LIst. IStMS-significances are the meaning in the mind of 
the Subject of the elements belonging to the Ideal Structure Mythical Superstructure. 
PBMS-significance PBMs∑ have in Dζ  an attribution in respect to the abstract relation
belonging to IDS if ( )k PBMi DR s ζ∑∈  IStMS-significance IStMs∑ has in Dζ  an attribution in 
respect to the abstract relation kiR belonging to IDS if ( )k IStMi DR s ζ∑∈ . 
Ideological Doxical 
Superstructure 
 (IDS) 
Values in fact, Dom inant Ideology, 
Primogenial Base 
PB1: Archetypes 
PB2: Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(symbolic materialization)
Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  Ideal Values, abstract ideology 
Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
image (IDS-image). 
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
last goal
near goal
inverse-MS-image
inverse-MS-projection (concretion)
ACTUAL
IDEAL
Actual Structural Base 
Desirable Structural Base
3
connotative-SB- projection 
(textual materialization)
Figure 3: Hypothesis of the relationship between structural base-doxical and   
mythical superstructures on second approach. 
 
Then: 
 
1) For some IDS-significances Ds  there is a single PBMS-significance 
PBMs∑  that 
we will call the inverse-MS-image (PB-image) of  in PB and that PBMs∑
( ) { },PBM k kD i D iR s Rε ζ∑ = ∈ .  
k
iR
Σs
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2) Corresponding to each  IStM-significance IStMs∑  in ISt, there is a single IDS-
significance IStMs
→
∑  which we will call the inverse-MS-projection (IDS-projection) 
of the ISt-significance IStMs∑  in the doxical superstructure (IDS) and that 
IStMs
→
∑  for 
each ζ∑ and for each ( ), IStMDS DS DS Di I i s ζ
→
∑∈ ∈ , iff ( )C IStMDS Di s ζ∑∈ . 
3) The inverse-MS-image (PB-image) can have an exchange, readjustment or 
different interpretation from myths and ideal values, and from the primogenial 
foundation of any ideology and belief system.   
4) Inverse-MS-projections (IDS-projections) constitute "adjustments" on ideologies 
and belief systems.   
5) Inverse-MS-projections (IDS-projections) constitute a process of concretization 
or passage of the ideal abstract ideology to the concrete ideology that is 
perceived with immediate form in relation to its opposite ideal.   
We consider the Ist-Mythical Superstructure and The Doxical Superstructure (IDS) like 
two alysidal sets with unequal cardinal number of alysidal elements (Figure 4). 
ISt-Mythical Superstructure
1
2
3
Ideal Abstract Ideology
Ideal Values
Utopia (last goal)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ideological Doxical Superstructure (Bal)
Concrete ideology
Values in fact
Inmediate goals
Art
Science Folk beliefs
Religion
ρ
ρ1
ρ2
ρ
ρ4
ρ5
ρ6
ρ7
1
n1
ρ2
n2
ρ 3
n3
m1
m2
3
m3
m4
m5
m6
m7
(Aal)
f:(Aal)=Bal
Injective function coupling
d1
d2 d3
(Ideal)
(Actual)
ideological 
distances
 
Figure 4: Case of two alysidal sets with unequal cardinal number of alysidal 
elements. 
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We call Aal and Bal to two alysidal sets (ISt-Mythical Superstructure and Ideological 
Doxical Superstructure). By simplification, we suppose that Aal has three alysidal 
elements, ( )1 2 31 2 3, ,n n nρ ρ ρ  corresponding to the Ideal Abstract Ideology, Ideal Values and 
Utopia respectively. Bal has alysidal w elements ( )1 2 31 2 3, , ,...., wn n n nwρ ρ ρ ρ  corresponding to 
the Concrete Ideology, Values in fact, Immediate goals, Art, Science, Folk beliefs, 
Religion and so on. Subscripts correspond to substantive 
beliefs considered like nodes in the theory of Alysidal sets.  The coupling function 
( )3Xwal alf A B=  is an injective coupling function6. In Alysidal Algebra (Nescolarde-
Selva et al, 2012a,b,c; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2012; Usó-Doménech and 
Nescolarde-Selva, 2012), each alysidal element is a chain formed by n interrelated 
elements (nodes). In this case, the nodes are substantive beliefs interrelated with abstract 
relations.   
Example 2: We consider the Abstract Ideology belonging to ISt-Mythical 
Superstructure and the Dominant Ideology belonging to the Doxical Superstructure as 
two alysidal sets with a single element (Figure 5). 
 
                                                          
6 A coupling function is a correspondence between two Alysidal sets Aal and Bal a map fal:Aal→P(Bal) from 
the elements(chains) of the Alysidal set Aal to the power set of Bal  (Nescolarde-Selva et.al. 2012a).  
 
.,...,,,,,, 321321 wmmmmnnn
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Abstract Ideal Ideology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Concrete Ideology
ISt-Mythical Superstructure
ideological Doxical Superstructure
1
2
3
4
5
6
a
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
l
Concretion gnorpsic functions
departure
nodes
arrival nodes
(AI)
(CI)
 
Figure 5: Case of two alysidal sets with a single element. 
 
Nodes are substantive beliefs (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013c) and binary 
relations are abstract relations between substantive beliefs. In figure 5 the following 
pairs have formed:  (1, a), (2, b), (3, d), (4, e), (5, f), (6, g).  
 
*** 
 
Abstract ideology will be the domain and concrete ideology will be the co-domain. 
In AST if one alysidal element ki℘ of Aal has n nodes and the alysidal element 
l
j℘ of Bal 
has m nodes, the space of possibilities of coupling will be nxm. Nevertheless, in this 
space of possibilities, a single one "is chosen" as much by the alysidal element ki℘ as by 
the lj℘ . The other possibilities are rejected, however if alysidal element 
l
j alB℘ ∈ "knew" 
that in that certain node it must make a coupling,  we will have to define a function of 
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knowledge or gnorpsic function7 (of the Greek γνωρψία: to know) (Nescolarde-Selva et 
al, 2012b; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2012) associated to the connection 
between alysidal element ki alA℘ ∈  and the 
l
j alB℘ ∈ . The gnorpsic function 
m j
i
k l
i j
n
fω ℘ →℘  is the function that determines that node ni (departure node) of alysidal 
element ki alA℘ ∈ that is connected with node mj (arrival node) of the alysidal element
l
j alB℘ ∈ . Subindex ni indicates the departure node, supraindex mj the of arrival node 
and supraindex ω the order of coupling.  
If connection of ni (departure node) is only with an only arrival node mj, the function 
will be mono-gnorpsic and we denote it as 1
m j
i
k l
i j
n
f℘ →℘ .  If the connection of ni 
(departure node) is with two arrival node mj, mk, the function will be bi-gnorpsic and we 
denote it as 
,
2
m mj k
i
k l
i j
n
f℘ →℘ .  If connection of ni (departure node) has  only three arrival 
nodes mj, mk, ml the function will be tri-gnorpsic and we it denote as 
,,
3
m m mj k l
i
k l
i j
n
f℘ →℘ .  
If the connection of ni (departure node) has many arrival nodes mj, mk, ml, …,mω the 
function will be poli-gnorpsic and we it denote as 
,...,,m m mj k j
i
k l
i j
n
f
ω
ω ℘ →℘ .  In the case that 
we are considering, we have a mono-gnorpsic function 1
m j
i
k l
i j
n
f℘ →℘  , but with a special 
meaning:  the concretization of the ideals with concrete substantive beliefs.  Let AI and 
CI be the abstract ideal and concrete ideologies so that al alAI A CI B∈ ∧ ∈  
A concretization function that we denote as  ( )
j
i
m
con
n
f AI CI→ is  the mono-gnorpsic 
function that determines that the substantive ideal belief ni (departure substantive ideal 
belief) of the alysidal element AI ISt Mythical Superstructure∈ −  is connected with the 
concrete substantive belief mj (arrival concrete substantive belief) of the alysidal 
element CI DS∈ . 
 
Example 3: In the case of figure 5, the concretization functions are: 
                                                          
7 A gnorpsic function and we denote as lj
k
i
m
n
f
j
i
℘→℘ω is a function that determines that node ni 
(departure node) of alysidal element al
k
i A∈℘  is connected with node mj (arrival node) of alysidal 
element al
l
j B∈℘  (Nescolarde-Selva, et. al., 2012b). 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
2
3
4
5
6
a
con
b
con
d
con
e
con
f
con
g
con
f AI CI
f AI CI
f AI CI
f AI CI
f AI CI
f AI CI
→
→
→
→
→
→
 
 
*** 
These concretization functions turn ideal substantive beliefs in concrete substantive 
beliefs.   
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
1) Ideal values, and myth (as residual ideology) belong to the Mythical 
Superstructure (MS). Its projection conforms, with the image coming from the 
Structural Base (SB), the dominant ideology and also the values of the 
Ideological Doxical Superstructure (IDS), and this projects on the  SB in the 
form of actions and conduct and are reflected on the Mythical Superstructure 
(MS) like utopia, that is the ultimate objective of the ideology.   
2) Myth has utopic elements that may reflect “symbolic capital” or ideal social 
values that are important for social cohesion. In a sense, lack of symbolic 
capital, or “symbolic decapitation” is equivalent to “demoralization” or the 
dissolving of the social group. 
 
3) Modern man apparently does not believe in myths but unconsciously they are in 
the depths of his mind. However ancient myths live in our culture. We find 
references to those myths in many contemporary words and expressions, such as 
Pandora's box, Oedipus complex, nymph, and Olympian. Other words derived 
from mythology include Adonis (from Adonis), aurora (from Aurora), 
chlorophyll (from Chloris), chronology (from Kronos), discipline (from 
Disciplina), discord (from Discordia), eros (from Eros), fate (from Fate), fauna 
(from Faunus), fidelity (from Fides), flora (from Flora), fortune (from Fortuna), 
fraud (from Fraus), Hades (from Hades), Hell (from Hel), hygiene (from 
Hygieia), jovial (from Jove), liberty (from Libertas), lunar (from Luna), 
morphine (from Morpheus), mortality (from Mors), mute (from Muta), 
narcissism (from Narcissus), nemesis (from Nemesis), ocean (from Oceanus), -- 
and the names of the planets, and of some the months (including Janus for 
January), etc. Mars (the Roman war god) is remembered in words such as Mars 
(the planet), March (the month), and martial (as in martial arts). 
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4) In terms of 21th century experience, the general thesis that all societies create 
myths seems highly plausible and, even without laborious evidence, convincing. 
Our modern society has its own myths. Some authors say that our society lacks a 
vigorous mythology; they believe that this lack can cause a sense of 
meaninglessness, estrangement, rootlessness, and the cold brittleness of a life 
devoid of reverence and awe. Other authors assert that we do have a mythology -
- in certain concepts (such as "progress") and in our larger-than-life celebrities 
(e.g., Mother Teresa as the goddess of compassion, Albert Einstein as the god of 
the intellect and the imagination, and Bill Gates as the god of commerce). The 
media enlarges certain people to mythical proportions, and we each do the same 
individually (often by projecting the "Hero" archetype onto other people). 
Corporations have a mythology, in their "corporate culture." There is a 
mythology in every group -- our social club, our family, our profession, our 
subculture, our ethnic group, our religion and denomination, our city, our 
neighborhood, our friendships, etc. Our mythology changes as our culture 
changes, from one generation to the next, from one presidential administration to 
the next, from one decade to the next. 
5) There are primitive myths, tribal beliefs, sometimes apprehended and always 
just below the surface, waiting for a time when to appear, waiting for suitable 
social or economic circumstances or for a time for a charismatic leader to give a 
new life to the group. Aryan myth led to World War II and the extermination 
camps. The myth of the proletariat led to tyranny, misery and Gulag. Islamic 
myth has led the Muslim world to jihad or holy war with the consequences of 
terrorism and regional wars that threaten to spread in the world.  
6) Closer to common man, movies and TV series are full of mythical figures: 
Aphrodite is hidden under the perfect lover, Lilith under the assassin and is 
contrary to the images of motherhood and the female. Hercules and Achilles are 
features of the hero and Superman. Ulysses is part of the traveler and the 
Argonauts of space adventures. The myth of the end of the world is presented in 
movies that speak of deadly viruses, devastating wars, etc. Today, myth often 
means a simplistic and illusory belief, such as in the expression "the myth of 
progress" that could transcribe as "simplistic and illusory belief in the 
inevitability of change for the better". 
 
Granted, however, that science the negative canons or conditions of scientific belief 
stated above distinguish between myth and non-myth. But by using these canons or 
conditions, whatever myths are discovered, even though they may be scientific, they 
will not necessarily be false. They are myths because: 
a)  they transcend all possible scientific truth criteria, and are thus beyond empirical 
testing; or 
b) while they theoretically conform to truth-criteria, they are not practically testable, 
as, for example, beliefs which, though not today verifiable, are consistent with the 
available data; or  
c) they serve as basic postulates of a social system to integrate human action and 
define its procedures, and may consist of rules for evaluating social results and of 
operations which define socially approved ways of achieving results; while finally,  
d) they transcend existing truth-criteria, though at a later time truth-criteria for testing 
such beliefs may be invented or discovered. Such beliefs (myths) are accepted 
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because of their special and general social utility, and their special and general 
significance for the society and its members. 
e) The mathematical approach outlined above provides a step towards specifying the 
meanings of myths with rigor. We have outlined the broad linguistic and 
psychological significance of myth, and believe that these models offer a means of 
being precise with the meaning.  
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